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13.1  Introduction 
Throughout the seven-year duration of the GATT Uruguay Round (UR), ag- 
ricultural negotiation continued to be a major  stumbling block.  Because of 
domestic resistance to these negotiations, the Japanese and Korean govern- 
ments were unable to play a sufficiently positive role in the Round despite the 
large benefits they are expected to receive from the successful conclusion of 
the Round.’ Their dilemma was clearly demonstrated by their evasion of the 
“tariffication” of  rice,  effectively  violating  of  the principles  of  the GATT/ 
WTO. 
Tariffication, by  which  all  existing  nontariff  barriers  are  converted  into 
bound duties, is a key element regarding market access in the Agreement on 
Agriculture embodied in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. Yet Japan man- 
aged to make rice exempt from tariffication for a six-year grace period from 
1995 to 2000 by giving compensation in the form of increased “minimum ac- 
cess” import quotas, from 4 percent of its domestic rice consumption in 1995 
to 8 percent by 2000; the minimum  access obligation under tariffication is 
graduated only from 3 percent to 5 percent within the six-year period. Like- 
wise, Korea agreed to increase minimum access imports from  1 percent of 
Yujiro Hayami is professor of international economics at Aoyama Gakuin University. Yoshihisa 
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1. The Japanese government prohibited rice imports during the last quarter-century with a few 
notable exceptions. This import prohibition  has occasionally been  criticized as a violation of 
GATT rules at international talks. To  take an outstanding example, the Rice Millers’ Association 
(RMA) of the United States filed complaints under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act calling for 
the opening of the Japanese rice market in 1986 and 1988. The US.  Trade Representative (USTR) 
substantially dismissed the claims by the RMA, presupposing that the rice issue would be resolved 
at the UR negotiations. Although there was great pressure on the rice market, the Japanese Diet 
adopted resolutions requiring the government to firmly maintain rice import prohibitions in 1980, 
1984, and 1988. 
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Table 13.1  Producer Subsidies and Consumer Burdens by Agricultural 




output  -CSE/PSE  1974-76  1984-86 
Economy  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Japan  69  112  40  33 
(Rice)  (92)  (97) 
European Union  48  74  86  114 
United States  22  45  157  159 
Australia  10  29  348  426 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Agricultural Policies, Mar- 
ketund Trade (Paris, 1985, 1991), and Food Consumption Sruristics (Paris, 1985, 1991). 
Note:  PSE,  producer  subsidy  equivalent;  CSE,  consumer  subsidy  equivalent;  Grain  self- 
sufficiency rate, total grain output/total grain consumption. 
base-period domestic consumption to 4 percent during the 1995-2004  period 
with a 10-year postponement of rice market tariffication. Indeed, this experi- 
ence in Japan and Korea demonstrated that rice in East Asia is not simply an 
economic good but a cultural heritage, and therefore, is easily influenced by 
political forces. 
The question to be addressed in this paper is: What political forces oppose 
the  acceptance of  the  general  agreements on  agriculture of  the  Uruguay 
Round? We will try to find an answer mainly in reference to the case of rice in 
Japan, but the substance of this study is expected to apply to Korea, as well. 
The answer to this question will become a basis for projection to agricultural 
policies and trade regimes in northeast Asia for a decade following the Uru- 
guay Round. 
13.2  A Perspective on the Uruguay Round Agricultural Negotiations 
In order to understand the unique response of Japan (and Korea) to the UR 
agricultural negotiations, it is useful to compare its position in regard to ag- 
ricultural protection with those of the European Union, the United States, and 
Australia (table 13.1). 
13.2.1  Stylized Facts of Agricultural Protection 
Column (1) in table 13.1 compares the levels of  agricultural protection in 
terms of  the ratio of producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) to total agricultural 
output for 1991-93.  PSE measures the increase in producers’ income owing to 
all protective policies, including both border protection and domestic subsidy 
payments. According to this measure, agricultural protection in Japan is very 
high, with the PSE ratio amounting to about 70 percent, as compared with 373  Rice Policy in Japan 
about 50 percent in the European Union, 20 percent in the United States, and 
10 percent in Australia. Especially high is the protection for rice, with PSE 
amounting to nearly 90 percent of output value. Note that these ratios use ag- 
ricultural output values as denominators. If we assume value added from agri- 
culture to be 60 percent of output value, Japan’s PSE for 1991-93  amounted to 
115 percent of  agricultural GDP, implying that the national income of Japan 
would have increased by  15 percent with the elimination of the agricultural 
sector.2 
In table 13.1, strong inverse correlation can be observed between the PSE 
ratio in column (1) and the grain self-sufficiency ratios in columns (3) and (4). 
This inverse association seems to reflect the general tendency for countries 
with lower comparative advantage in agriculture to undertake higher protec- 
tion. It is noteworthy, however, that both the United States and Australia, which 
obviously have high comparative advantage in agriculture, are engaging in ag- 
ricultural protection to a significant degree. Again, assuming value added to be 
60 percent of output value, the ratio of PSE to agricultural GDP is nearly 40 
percent in the United  States and  15 percent even in Australia. Thus, Japan’s 
high protection on agriculture is but one example of the stylized facts that (1) 
developed countries exercise high protection on agriculture and (2) the degree 
of protection is higher for countries with lower comparative advantage in agri- 
~ulture.~ 
13.2.2 
Another important observation in table  13.1 is the inverse correlation be- 
tween the ratio of negative consumer subsidy equivalent -CSE  to PSE in col- 
umn (2) and the grain self-sufficiency  ratios in columns (3) and (4). Income 
support for farmers as measured by PSE is considered to consist of  income 
transfers from both consumers and taxpayers. Border protection increases the 
purchase price of agricultural commodities, and thus consumers experience a 
decrease in purchasing power or real income. CSE is therefore a measure of 
the extent to which consumers support protection via income reduction. On the 
other hand, the transfer from taxpayers takes the form of government subsidy 
payments. Thus, the ratio of  -CSE  to PSE measures how much agricultural 
protection  is obtained at the expense of consumers relative to that from the 
government budget. 
The Common Interest of the European Union and the United States 
2. The ratio of gross value added to output value in rice is estimated to be a little less than 70 
percent, using annual surveys by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries on 
rice production cost (Kome Seisanhi Chosa). The sample of farmers in this survey is said to be 
biased toward high-yield farmers, and the profitability of rice exceeds the average level for other 
agricultural products. If we consider these points, the real ratio of  gross value added in Japanese 
agriculture  may  be  below  60 percent  of  total  output  value. Thus, the  value  added  of  Japa- 
nese agriculture is somewhat overestimated in the text. Nevertheless, it is concluded that GDP 
would increase if the agricultural sector were eliminated. 
3. Such relations are also confirmed by  econometric analysis in Honma and Hayami (1986a. 
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The high ratio of  -CSE  for Japan and the low ratios for the United States 
and Australia reflect the fact that in a major food-importing country like Japan, 
a high protection rate can be achieved mainly through border protection with 
relatively little pressure on the government budget, while major food exporters 
must rely on the treasury if they want to support the income of farmers. From 
this perspective, the critically important factor underlying the adoption of ag- 
ricultural policy reform as an issue in the Uruguay Round could be identified 
as the change in position of the European Union from a net grain importer in 
the 1970s to a net exporter in the 1980s, as shown in columns (3) and (4). 
Since the formation of the European Community in 1957 until the  1970s, 
the European Union was a world-leading importer of grains and many other 
agricultural  commodities. As  long  as import margins  remained  large, the 
Union could protect farmers at a target level mainly by means of the variable 
levies that produced revenue instead of cost to the EU government. However, 
as domestic agricultural production  grew under heavy  protection  from  the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), imports progressively declined, resulting 
in a growing shortage of variable levy revenue relative to the needs of main- 
taining the CAP  program. This shortage became more acute in the 1980s, when 
the Union became a net exporter. Because surplus commodities above domes- 
tic consumption were created by the heavy protection, producers could not find 
commercial outlets in the international market. Inadvertently, through export 
subsidies the European Union began overseas dumping activities. Under the 
pressure of surplus products, the budget cost of CAP loomed large and became 
politically intolerable, especially in the mid-1980s when the world food market 
was dampened. 
This was the reason why the European Union and the United States agreed 
to put agricultural policy reform on the agenda of the UR negotiations. In other 
words, once the European Union became a net exporter, it was in the same 
boat as the United States. It was no longer possible for the EU and U.S. govern- 
ments to finance agricultural protection at the expense of consumers. Given the 
high political cost of raising taxes, it became an absolute necessity to reduce 
agricultural protection or, at least, to stop further growth of protection. If they 
had not shared this problem, it is difficult to envisage that negotiations on ag- 
ricultural policy reform would ever have been undertaken. 
Surplus production due to excessive protection was the basic cause of loom- 
ing budget costs in exporting countries. Thus, the UR agricultural negotiations 
could not be limited to the issue of trade rules and market access but had to be 
expanded to cover domestic agricultural policy and export subsidies. 
From this perspective, CAP reform in 1992 under the lead of EC Commis- 
sioner Ray McSharry would have been undertaken even in the absence of  UR 
negotiations, although there is little doubt that the reform was facilitated by 
the Round.4 CAP reform was essentially a shift from the traditional EC policy 
4. For more detail, see International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (1994.46-51). 375  Rice Policy in Japan 
of supporting farm prices by means of border protection to a protection struc- 
ture similar to that of the United States, consisting of acreage control and sub- 
sidy payments to farmers. This policy shift has already demonstrated its effec- 
tiveness in curbing farm production, so export surpluses are likely to decrease 
in the future. 
13.2.3  The Unique Position of Japan 
It is important to recognize that Japan has not been in the same situation as 
the European Union and the United States. As indicated in table 13.1, the im- 
port margin of grains has been widening, and the cost of agricultural protection 
has been almost completely covered by consumers. With increasing affluence, 
consumers are becoming more tolerant of high food prices, although most of 
them do not realize how high prices actually are. Their tolerance is especially 
high for rice, mainly because it has turned out to be an inferior good, whereby 
demand shrinks in response to increases in income level. As the share of rice 
in consumer expenditure is now less than 2 percent (compared with about 3 
percent for vegetables), its effect on the cost of living has become insignificant. 
As a result, neither business employers nor labor unions are concerned about 
the price of rice. Thus, the countervailing force against agricultural protection 
has disappeared from Japanese s~ciety.~ 
Consumer tolerance of agricultural protection is common in affluent socie- 
ties. What makes Japan unique relative to the European Union and the United 
States is the relative absence of countervailing pressure from the Ministry of 
Finance; this is because Japan as a major food importer is able to charge con- 
sumers for the costs of protection. Under this unique condition Japan has had 
little political incentive to promote agricultural policy reform in the arena of 
the Uruguay Round. While the expected benefit from a freer trade regime is 
obviously very large, the benefit would be distributed widely but thinly among 
consumers, business concerns, and organized laborers. No interest group has 
sufficient incentive to exercise countervailing power against the strong political 
pressure of the farm bloc. Thus, it appears reasonable to hypothesize that Japan 
remained very passive in the UR agricultural negotiations and tried to evade as 
much as possible any agreement that would have provoked the anger of  the 
farm bloc partly because the farm bloc is politically  very powerful as it is 
disproportionately represented in the national Diet, but more importantly be- 
cause no other political bloc dared to undertake the countermeasure of promot- 
ing the negotiations. 
Under such conditions, Japanese negotiators, who first tried to take the lead 
in advancing the Round when it began in 1986, failed to make active contribu- 
tions as the negotiations dragged on. Instead, they were forced to adopt the 
usual Japanese stance of waiting for other nations to work out a solution and 
then accepting the agreement, making as few concessions as possible. 
5. For more detail. see Hayami (1988, chaps. 1 and 3). 376  Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo 
13.3  Evasion of Rice Tariffication 
Now, the relevant question to ask is: Why was rice market tariffication so 
strongly opposed by the Japanese government?  Would tariffication destroy Jap- 
anese agriculture and result in an unbearable burden on Japanese farmers as 
well as the demise of  an agricultural heritage? In fact, this scenario seems 
unlikely from any calculations based on sound knowledge. 
13.3.1  Possible Impact of Tariffication 
The tariffication plan outlined in the UR agreement is the following: replace 
in  1995 all nontariff barriers by tariffs at rates equivalent to the differences 
between domestic (wholesale) and international (import c.i.f.) prices and, then, 
reduce tariff rates by 36 percent on the average with a minimum of 15 percent 
reduction for individual commodities within the six-year period from 1995 to 
2000. How would this scheme affect Japanese rice farmers? It is more than 
reasonable to assume that upon acceptance of this plan, the Japanese govern- 
ment would seek approval for the application of the minimum 15 percent tariff 
reduction on rice. This implies that the average reduction in rice tariff rates per 
year would be only 2.7 percent. The effect of the tariff reduction in lowering 
the domestic price of  rice  in the following six years can be calculated as 
follows. 
The average rate of reduction in the tariff rate (a X  100 percent) needed to 
reduce the tariff rate by  15 percent within the six-year period is calculated as 
2.7 percent (a = 0.027) per year from following relation: 
(1 -  = 0.85. 
If rice is allowed to be imported freely from abroad at the tariff rate oft X  100 
percent, the relation between the domestic price (P)  and the import c.i.f. price 
(R)  of rice is established as 
P  = R (1 + t). 
If  t is reduced by a X  100 percent, the new domestic price (P')  becomes 
P'  = R [l + t (1 -  a)] 
The rate of reduction in the domestic price (c) corresponding to this tariff re- 
duction is calculated as 
at  -  -~  (P -  P') 
c= 
P  (1 + t)' 
In  general, for a given value of  a, the larger the value of  t, the larger the 
value of c. However, even if the initial tariff rate is set at 700 percent (t = 7), 
based on the rather high estimate of the tariff equivalent for rice in Japan made 
by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC 1990), and this rate is cut 
by  15 percent in six years or 2.7 percent (a = 0.027) per year, the domestic 377  Rice Policy in Japan 
price is expected to fall only by  2.3 percent per year. Even if an unrealistically 
high rate of  1,200 percent (t = 12) is assumed for the tariff equivalent, the rate 
of corresponding reduction in the domestic price is just 2.5 percent. On the 
other hand, if  the tariff equivalent is determined to be 300 percent (r = 3), 
according to the estimate by  the Forum for Policy Innovation (1990), which 
seems to be a more reasonable estimate, as discussed in appendix A, the rate 
of decline in the domestic price corresponding to a 2.7 percent reduction in the 
tariff rate is only 2.0 percent per year. 
This means that, if rice farmers in Japan were able to reduce their production 
costs at the speed of 2.5 percent per year, they would incur no damage from 
the UR tariffication. Considering the fact that the producer price of rice under 
government controls was lowered on average by  2.5 percent per year during 
1986-91,  it is reasonable to expect that Japanese farmers would be able to 
withstand the UR tariffication. 
It must be noted that the above calculation is based on the assumption of 
“clean” tariffication, in which the initial tariff rate is set exactly equal to the 
domestic-border price difference. In fact, because it is technically difficult to 
determine the relevant prices for the domestic and international markets, it is 
relatively easy to set the initial tariff rate significantly higher than necessary to 
prevent imports from occurring, as the EU example seems to demonstrate.‘j 
13.3.2  The Experience of Beef Tariffication 
Tariffication in itself would not cause imports to grow. The height of initial 
tariff rates and the speed of  their reduction determine how well imports do. 
This is clear from the previous experience with the tariffications of beef. 
A quota system for imported beef  was replaced by  tariffication in  1991 
through US.-Japan bilateral negotiation.’ Has this resulted in rapid growth of 
beef imports? The answer is no. As shown in table 13.2, while beef imports 
grew at an average annual rate of  20.4 percent over the five years that quotas 
were in effect, their annual growth averaged only 12.5 percent over the four 
years following the shift to tariffication. Meanwhile, annual domestic produc- 
tion remained almost constant at about 400 thousand tons.*  If the level of initial 
6. See International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (1994, 40-46).  Under the UR 
agreement the Food Agency of Japan is allowed to mark up the price of minimum access import 
rice to as high as 332 yedkg, which is eight times higher than the border price of  Thai rice. 
Therefore, it is likely that if Japan were to have accepted tariffication, the tariff rate of 700 percent 
would have applied to rice. This rate is far higher than the real tariff equivalent, as discussed in 
appendix A. 
7. The Japanese government imposed quotas on beef imports before 1990. The Livestock Indus- 
try Promotion Corporation (Chikusan Shinko Jigyodan), which is an extradepartmental organiza- 
tion of the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, controlled beef imports. Beef 
and oranges have been treated as symbols of the closed nature of Japanese market in U.S.-Japan 
trade talks. which became esDeciallv heated in the  1980s. The Jananese government withstood  L,  Y 
increasing import quotas at first but finally agreed to undertake beef tariffication (beginning in 
1991) in 1988. 
8. For a discussion of the influence of beef tariffication on domestic beef production, see Mori 
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Table 13.2  Imports of Beef to Japan, 1985-94 
I  Average 20.4 
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Source: Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Monthly Statistics ofilgriculture, 
Foresfry, and Fisheries (Tokyo, various issues). 
tariffs and the speed of tariff cuts are set appropriately, it can be argued that 
tariffication can be more effective in curbing imports than are quantitative im- 
port restrictions. 
In the case of beef, the tariff rate was reduced by about 30 percent within 
the two years from 1991 to 1993, which was six times faster than the minimum 
allowable rate of reduction of 15 percent over six years (equivalent to 5 percent 
over two years) in the UR agreement. If the tariff rate reduction for beef had 
been as small as 5 percent, the tariff rate in 1993 would have been 66 percent 
instead of the actual level of 50 percent. In this case, judging from the decrease 
in beef imports in the first years of tariffication under the tariff rate of 70 per- 
cent, it is unlikely  that any significant increase in beef imports would have 
occurred after tariffication if the conditions of tariffication applied to beef were 
the same as those of the UR tariffication applicable to rice. 
13.3.3  Effectiveness of Safeguards 
Often cited by opponents of tariffication was the danger of increases in rice 
imports due to sharp declines in border prices, which might arise from such 
factors as foreign exchange rate appreciation, changes in overseas supply con- 
ditions, and dumping by exporters. 
However, the UR agreement includes strong safeguard measures. One is the 
“special safeguards” provision that allows the importer to increase the tariff 
rate corresponding to the decline in border price or import quantity increase. 
Another could be the use of a specific duty instead of an ad valorem tariff. The 
safeguard power will be extremely strong for a commodity like rice in Japan, 
characterized by a large domestic-border price difference, if the price-trigger 
safeguard and the specific duty are combined. This is illustrated in table 13.3, 379  Rice Policy in Japan 
Table 13.3  Illustration of Safeguard Measures 
Ad Valorem Tariff  Specific Duty 
Price-  Quantity-  Price-  Quantity- 
Safeguard  Safeguard  Safeguard  Safeguard  Safeguard  Safeguard 
No  Trigger  Trigger  No  Trigger  Trigger 
Border price  50 yenlkg 
Tariff (300%)  150 
Domestic price (A)  200 
10  10  Border price 
Tariff (300%)  30  4@ 
Domestic price (B)  40  56 
Rate of  domestic 
price decrease 
1 




10  10  10  10 
39b  150  166'  195' 
79  160  176  205 
-40  -20  -  12  3 
"Initial  tariff plus 16.4 yenlkg: 
(37 -  39)  (40 -  37)  o,9 
X 0.6 +  ~  (30 -  '0)  x 0.5 +  ~  5  x 0  (20 -  5) 
16.4 =  ~  +-  --XO.3+--- 
10%  10%-40%  40%-60%  60%-75%  above 75% 
h30 X  1.3  (increase in the tariff rate by 30 percent when import quantity increases by 26 percent from the 
previous three-year average). 
'150  X  1.3 (as in note b). 
in which as an extreme case the border price declines from 50 yen/kg to only 
10 yen/kg, under the assumption of an initial tariff rate of 300 percent. 
Initially, the domestic price is assumed to be 200 yen/kg through the addition 
of a 300 percent tariff (150 yenkg) to the border price of 50 yen/kg. If the ad 
valorem tariff is applied, corresponding to the reduction in the border price 
from 50 to 10 yenkg, the domestic price will decline sharply from 200 to 40 
yen/kg. Special safeguards will be of little help in this situation. However, if 
the specific duty is fixed at 150 yen/kg, the domestic price will decrease only 
slightly from 200 to 160 yen/kg despite the border price decrease from 50 to 
10 yen/kg. If  the price-trigger safeguard is applied in addition, the domestic 
price of imported rice will decrease only to 176 yen/kg. If the quantity-trigger 
safeguard is applied instead, the new domestic price of imported rice will be 
higher than the prior domestic price level, with no possibility of  further in- 
crease in rice imports. 
13.3.4  Vested Interests against Tariffication 
Thus, if the initial tariff rate is appropriately set to cover the domestic-border 
price difference and the safeguard measures are adequately combined, rice im- 
ports under tariffication can be kept much lower than the level of imports under 
increased minimum access. This is an easy conclusion to draw, about which 
capable government officials in Japan could hardly be ignorant. So why did 380  Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo 
Japan endeavor to make rice an exception to the general principle of the UR 
agreement? 
The answer  appears to be because tariffication  threatens  to damage the 
vested interests that are protected by the nation’s food control ~ystem.~  In par- 
ticular, it would eventually destroy the monopolistic control over rice market- 
ing enjoyed by the Food Agency and agricultural cooperatives. Under the Food 
Control Law, all rice is supposed to be collected by village agricultural cooper- 
atives and is sold either to the Food Agency (the “government rice” channel) or 
to licensed wholesalers (the “voluntary rice” channel) for further distribution at 
the retail  level, even though  some rice  is, in practice,  distributed  illegally 
through the black market (“free rice”; see fig. 13.1). In order to establish rice- 
selling rights through legal channels, rice farmers have to divert a certain por- 
tion of their paddy field area away from rice production; this acreage control 
program was created to maintain domestic rice prices far above the market 
equilibrium level under autarky. This system has been the major source of insti- 
tutional rent for both agricultural cooperatives and the Food Agency. The rent 
partly goes to farmers through price increases. But it mainly goes to the Food 
Agency and the agricultural cooperatives in order to continually expand the 
size of these institutions. It should be noted that almost all farmers are mem- 
bers of  agricultural  cooperatives,  yet  there are cases  in which the benefits 
received  by  individuals  differ  from  the  benefits  received  by  cooperatives. 
Agricultural cooperatives, through their strong political power, oppose tariffi- 
cation, although certain members within the cooperatives have different opin- 
ions on the issue. 
Introducing tariffication would be like drilling a hole in this food control 
system, in which all rice is controlled by the Food Agency. It is a step toward 
the market-oriented reform of the rice distribution system. In contrast, the min- 
imum access import quota system, in which rice imports are all controlled by 
the Food Agency, presents no opportunity for such reform. It is conceivable 
that windfall profits from the mark-up sale of minimum access foreign rice at 
the high domestic price will be used in order to strengthen the present food 
control system. 
Under the present system, rice production in Japan is controlled by paying 
farmers subsidies to reduce the amount of  farmland dedicated to growing the 
crop. This helps maintain high prices that far exceed the levels that would pre- 
vail under free market conditions. Also, acreage control is allocated almost 
equally among farmers, with the effect of preventing the concentration of rice 
production  among more efficient growers. This  is a major  obstacle to ex- 
ploiting in scale economies that have emerged in the agricultural industry since 
9. Corresponding to the acceptance of the UR agreement, the government enacted in 1994 the 
so-called New Food Law  to replace the Food Control Law.  (The new  law comes into effect  1 
November 1995.) Similar to the old law, the new law is very general and abstract so that it is hard 
to judge how the rice distribution system will be changed. The future depends much on ministerial 
orders and administrative guidance. For details, see Godo and Honma (1997). 381  Rice Policy in Japan 
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Fig. 13.1  System of rice marketing under the Food Control Law 
Note; Wholesalers and  retailers are licensed  by region. 
the large-scale progress in mechanization induced by sharp increases in wage 
rates in the 1970s.  And because rice prices and marketing systems are inflexi- 
ble, this prevents farmers from making the most of their entrepreneurial abili- 
ties (see Hayami 1988, chaps. 3 and 6).  One way of enhancing these abilities 
would be to remove government controls on rice marketing and to promote 
cost reduction by gradual reduction of domestic prices. By evading tariffication 
while keeping rice prices high by reducing rice acreage at a rate equivalent to 
the increase in minimum access imports, perhaps the incentive for reforms will 
be weakened. 
Indeed, the maintenance of high domestic prices by means of acreage con- 
trol in response to shrinking domestic demand has been the continual policy 
mix in Japan and has consistently hindered the growth of Japanese agriculture. 
This policy mix is likely to continue in an accentuated manner with increased 
minimum access imports. If the evasion of tariffication is harmful rather than 
beneficial to agriculture, one could maintain that it has been adopted because it 
protects the vested interests of the Food Agency and agricultural cooperatives. 
In order to support the arguments above we will try to show, by means of a 
simple simulation analysis, the likely course of  the rice sector after the Uru- 
guay Round under the traditional policy  mix in contrast with possible other 
courses under alternative policy mixes. 382  Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo 
13.4  The Political Economy Dynamics of the Rice Market 
As a background to the simulation analysis, this section tries to identify the 
goals and means of traditional rice policy in Japan in terms of the policy’s con- 
sequences. 
13.4.1  Policy-Induced CyclesIo 
The revealed objective of Japan’s rice policy since the 1960s, when Japan 
joined the group of high-income countries, appears to be the support of domes- 
tic producer prices within the constraints of  the government budget. Various 
policy  means designed to  achieve this  goal, when  interacted with  market 
forces, have created major fluctuations in the rice market as shown in figure 
13.2. 
Government efforts to increase the producer price of  rice were intensified 
especially in the early 1960s when high economic growth (kodo keizai seicho) 
widened rural-urban income disparity. Because all rice was then procured by 
the Food Agency through agricultural cooperatives, the producer price could 
be increased by  raising the government purchase price. Corresponding rapid 
rises in the purchase price created a deficit for the Food Agency because the 
government sale price increase had a time lag of a few years. 
However, the extremely rapid increase in the government deficit during the 
1960s resulted more from the response of  the market to the increased price 
than from the increase in the negative government marketing margin. The in- 
creased producer price stimulated production and market supply. From 1960 
to 1968, total rice output increased by  14 percent (from 12.5 to 14.2 million 
tons), while total sales to the Food Agency rose faster, by as much as 67 percent 
(from 6.0 to 10.0 million tons). Given the negative marketing margin, the defi- 
cit from the food control program increased in proportion to the increase in 
rice procurement by the Food Agency. 
More serious was the accumulating surplus in government storage. During 
the 1960s,  rice became an inferior good with respect to per capita income rises; 
average per capita rice consumption per year declined steadily from a peak of 
118 kilograms in  1962 to  100 kilograms in  1970. In addition to negative in- 
come elasticity of demand, the increased price probably also contributed to the 
decline in rice consumption to some extent. With the bumper crop in 1967, the 
excess supply of rice became especially evident in the form of a sharp increase 
in the quantities of old rice in government stocks. 
The multiplying financial burden arising from excess supply forced the gov- 
ernment to introduce three simultaneous measures in 1968: (1) restraint on the 
price of  rice, (2) acreage control, and (3) disposal of  surplus rice.’’ For the 
subsequent three years, the producer price was kept the same. 
10. This section draws heavily on Hayami (1988, chap. 3, sec. 2). 
11. The first disposal of surplus rice occurred in 1971-74, with government expenditure reaching 
1 trillion yen (for the second instance, see n. 12). About 7.4 million metric tons were exported at 
low prices or crushed and used for feed or food processing. 383  Rice Policy in Japan 
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Fig. 13.2  Policy-induced cycles in the rice market 
Sources: Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (JMAFF),  Shokuryo Kanri  Tokei 
Nenpo (Annual report of food control statistics), Norin Suisun Sho Tokeihyo (Statistical yearbook 
of JMAFF), Shokuryo Jikyu Hyo (Food balance sheets), Nogyo Hakusho Fuzoku Tokei Hyo (Statis- 
tical appendix to the Agricultural White Paper) (Tokyo, various years). 
In the short run, demand remains relatively price inelastic because rice is 
still culturally the staple food of the Japanese diet. Furthermore, the the short- 
term supply of  rice is mostly influenced by weather conditions and may not 
necessarily increase in response to price rises. Therefore, excess supply does 
not become especially significant even if  the price is raised above the market 
equilibrium. In such a situation, irrespective of how much the producer price 
is raised, it would not cause much financial burden to the government if  the 
consumer price were raised in parallel even with a few years' time lag. 
In  the long run, however, an excess supply of  rice becomes inevitable as 
long as the government continues to support the price of rice. On the supply 384  Yujio Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo 
side, the increased price stimulates the application of fertilizers and other in- 
puts, and as a result, supply increases. Furthermore, on the demand side, con- 
sumers over time gradually substitute toward relatively cheaper, wheat-based 
products such as bread. When excess supply is created as the result of  long- 
run adjustments to the price support in demand and supply, the resulting extra 
costs, such as storage and surplus disposal costs, can no longer be passed on 
to consumers. 
During the 1960s, average per capita income rose very rapidly, to the extent 
that it doubled in a decade in real terms, and rice consumption declined gradu- 
ally both absolutely and relative to total household consumption expenditure. 
The increase in the consumer price of rice was therefore not strongly resisted, 
and in particular, there was no substantial political movement against the in- 
crease in rice prices. In the short run, since it was possible to pass on a large 
part to consumers, the rice price support was raised without too much stress 
on the treasury. But over the long run, due to the response of the market, it 
became an increasingly unbearable burden on the government. 
It may seem strange that the rice price began to be raised again in 1973, as 
soon as the disposal of surplus rice was completed and demand-supply equilib- 
rium was restored by the success of the acreage control program.’2 This was 
partly due to the outbreak of the so-called world food crisis of 1973-74.  Sharp 
increases in world food prices, coupled with the U.S. soybean embargo, stirred 
up anxiety in the p~b1ic.I~  The farm bloc took advantage of this situation in 
their lobbying for a price increase by advocating greater food self-sufficiency 
and security. 
However, another factor underlying the second surge of rice price support 
was perhaps that policymakers  were slow to predict the creation by  market 
forces of  a large surplus in response to further price increases. Even if  they 
foresaw this, it might have been difficult for them to present sufficiently strong 
reasons to counter the pressure for the price increase. Or it might have been 
the case that, given politicians’ high rate of discount on future costs and bene- 
fits balanced against their immediate need to stay in office, it was to their ad- 
vantage to yield to pressure from the farm bloc. 
At any rate, the price support was raised, and the acreage control program 
was relaxed. There followed a repetition of the experience of the 1960s. With 
increasing excess supply, surplus stock was accumulated, and the government 
deficit escalated, forcing a price freeze and a strengthening of acreage control 
in the late 1970s. 
The policy-induced cycles thus created have involved a large waste of  re- 
12. The second disposal of  surplus rice occurred in  1979-86.  A volume of  about 6 million 
metric tons was exported or sold for feed or food processing in just the same way  as in the first 
disposal. In this instance, government expenditure was 2 trillion yen. 
13. During the world food crisis, the United States invoked a soybean embargo from 27 June to 
8 September  1973 as a measure to counter inflation. As Japan is a major soybean importer, this 
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sources. An  obvious example is the accumulation of surplus rice and its dis- 
posal at huge cost. Another example is that paddy fields that, in response to 
high prices, had been converted from upland fields through large investments 
for the installation of  irrigation systems were diverted from rice production 
back to upland crops just when construction was completed. This suggests that 
social losses may result from state intervention when decisions are made with- 
out appropriate consideration of market forces. 
13.4.2  Emergency Rice Imports in 1993-94 
Emergency rice imports in  1993-94  in Japan, the first in two decades and 
ironically coinciding with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, can be under- 
stood as an extension of the policy-induced cycle. 
When the second surplus had somehow subsided by  1984, the government 
rice stock began to rise again, partly because production was stimulated by 
high prices and partly because domestic consumption continued to shrink. A 
third surplus did emerge in 1986-89,  but on a much smaller scale than in the 
previous two instances because the government was quick to strengthen acre- 
age control based on its experiences with the previous failures, with the re- 
duced area amounting to nearly one-quarter of the total paddy field area. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the government became overly cautious about 
the possibility of another major surplus. Acreage control was maintained at 
such a high level that the government rice stock was below the normal opera- 
tional inventory level when  the rice  crop was severely affected by  adverse 
weather conditions in 1993. (The official rice yield index declined by 26 per- 
cent.) Thus, the Food Agency had no option but to organize large-scale im- 
port activities. 
The shortfall of the 1993 rice crop was quickly replaced by  a bumper crop 
in the next year. The 1994 crop was stimulated by both high prices in the previ- 
ous year (especially in the black market) and relaxation of acreage control. By 
the end of the 1994 rice year (October 1995) the government rice stock reached 
a level of  1.6 million tons, nearly three-quarters of the 1987 level, which was 
the peak of the previous surplus era. Yet, it will not be easy for the government 
to curtail production for the next few years. A reduction in producer prices 
does not seem politically feasible because the farm bloc is demanding instead 
price hikes as compensation for the acceptance of the UR agreement. The same 
argument applies to acreage control. 
A likely course in the short run will be for the government to hold the surplus 
in  stock. Financial constraints on increasing the inventory carryover can be 
mitigated to some extent by Food Agency profits from the mark-up of mini- 
mum access import rice. Thus, it is not improbable that the government’s inven- 
tory accumulation will reach the levels of  the previous two surpluses of  the 
1970s and 1980s and that the government will thereafter return to the normal 
policy mix of high price support and increasing acreage reduction. If this hap- 
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and capital loss from surplus disposal will be inevitable, and productive invest- 
ments, such as agricultural research and extension, that are necessary for the 
revitalization of agriculture in the post-UR regime will have to be curtailed. 
13.5  A Simulation Analysis 
This section contrasts the economic implications of Japan’s postponement 
of tariffication on rice with those of other policy options by means of a simple 
simulation analysis. 
13.5.1  Alternative Scenarios 
The three options to be compared are: 
A.  Evade tariffication by increasing minimum access import quotas gradually 
from 4 percent of domestic consumption in 1995 to 8 percent in 2000; this 
external commitment is coupled with the domestic policy of strengthening 
acreage control to reduce rice production by the amount of minimum ac- 
cess imports so as to maintain the domestic price at the baseline level. The 
three variants of this scenario after 2000 are: 
A-a.  Continue to exempt rice from tariffication by  increasing  minimum 
access to 12 percent in 2006. 
A-b.  Shift to tariffication in 2001 and thereafter follow scenario B. 
A-c.  Shift to tariffication in 2001 and thereafter follow scenario C. 
B.  Start tariffication in 1995 with a pledged reduction in the tariff rate by  15 
percent until 2000, and gradually increase minimum access import quotas 
from 3 percent to 5 percent of  domestic consumption within the six-year 
period; this external commitment is coupled with the domestic policy of 
strengthening acreage control to reduce rice production by the amount of 
minimum access imports so as to prevent the domestic price from falling 
faster than the decrease resulting from the tariff cut. After 2000, the tariff 
rate will be reduced by another 15 percent within the next six years, while 
minimum access imports will be increased to 7 percent of  domestic con- 
sumption, which will be counteracted by  an equivalent increase in acre- 
age reduction. 
C.  Start tariffication in 1995 with the same external commitment as in sce- 
nario B, coupled with the domestic policy of relaxing acreage control by 1 
percent per year of total paddy field area throughout the period until 2006. 
In all three scenaios it is assumed that all the losses in producer surplus will 
be compensated by direct government payments to individual producers in a 
“decoupled” manner proportional to either their operational landholdings or 
their marketing volumes in the base period. Participants  in  acreage control 
programs also will be compensated so as to maintain their welfare position. 
Scenario A represents the likely course of the rice sector in Japan because 
the external commitment explained is the actual situation and the domestic 387  Rice Policy in Japan 
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Fig. 13.3  Effects of rice market opening in Japan 
policy outlined is the one most likely to be pursued in the medium run, even 
though in the short run a build-up of  government inventory may precede the 
strengthening of acreage control. 
Scenario B would have been the likely course had tariffication been chosen 
because, judging from the revealed preference of the government to support 
domestic producer prices as much as possible within budgetary constraints, it 
seems reasonable to expect that domestic policy will be designed so as to mini- 
mize the price decline after tariffication. 
For that reason, scenario C is unrealistic because its policy mix is unlikely 
to be chosen. It may, nevertheless, be a policy direction that would promote the 
survival and revitalization of Japanese agriculture in the international market. 
The simulation analysis traces changes in the domestic price and output of 
rice as well as government costs and producer and consumer welfare under 
three alternative policies. 
13.5.2  Model and Parameters 
Our analysis is based on a simple Marshallian partial equilibrium framework 
under a small-country assumption. The model of the rice market in Japan is 
shown in  figure 13.3, with the vertical axis representing price and the hori- 
zontal axis representing quantity.I4 
D, represents  the domestic demand schedule and  So represents  domestic 
14. The model used here is a revision of the model developed by Y. Hayami and K. Otuska in 
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supply in the absence of acreage control, implying that a is the point of  free 
market equilibrium under autarky. Rice policy in Japan for the past three de- 
cades has aimed at raising the domestic price above a. The resulting excess 
supply has been avoided by  shifting the supply curve to the left by  means of 
acreage control. 
The baseline (pre-market-opening) equilibrium is considered to be at point 
b, at which domestic demand (Do)  and domestic supply under acreage reduc- 
tion (S,) intersect. 
If minimum access imports are enforced in this situation and if the imported 
rice is discharged to the market, demand for domestic rice will shift from Do 
to D, with the price lowered to U,  which corresponds to equilibrium point c. 
The price can be maintained at P, however, if acreage control is strengthened 
so as to shift domestic supply from S, to S,.  This is the policy response assumed 
in scenario A. In this case there is little need for compensation to producers 
since their welfare position decreases only slightly, while there is no increase 
in consumer surplus. The government (Food Agency) gains by  area bdzy, the 
mark-up margin of minimum access rice. 
If  tariffication is introduced instead, there is no immediate impact on the 
domestic price because the difference between the domestic price (P)  and 
the import price (W) will be levied as a tariff (t  percent of W). Minimum access 
imports will have  the same effect as in scenario A, although their impact is 
quantitatively smaller. However, even if acreage control is strengthened so as 
to shift domestic supply from S, to S,, as assumed in scenario B, the domestic 
price cannot be maintained at level P for long, as the tariff rate will be reduced 
at the rate of  15 percent over six years. As the initial tariff rate (t)  is reduced 
by  r (X 100) percent, the domestic price is bound to decline from P to R and 
imports to increase by efabove the minimum access quota @). 
In contrast, if  acreage control is not strengthened while minimum access 
imports are undertaken, market equilibrium is established at c. At this point, if 
the market price of domestic rice (V) is lower than the price of imported rice 
after tariff payment (R),  as illustrated in figure 13.3, no additional imports will 
emerge beyond the minimum access amounts. Scenario C represents the case 
in which acreage control is relaxed instead of being left unchanged. Therefore, 
the likelihood of no additional imports occurring is higher than in the case of 
no changes in acreage control, represented by equilibrium point c.  For simplic- 
ity of presentation, we represent scenario C as the case of  no change in acre- 
age control. 
Gains in consumer welfare measured by consumer surplus can be calculated 
by taking integrals of Do with respect to price over the range from P to R for 
scenario B and from P to U for scenario C. Corresponding changes in producer 
surplus can be calculated by  taking integrals of  S,  (for scenario B) and of  S, 
(for scenario C). For specific computational formulas, see appendix B. 
As for basic parameters, we use 0.4 for the price elasticity of domestic sup- 
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used values for the analysis of the rice market (see Otsuka and Hayami 1985). 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the baseline level of  domestic con- 
sumption before the UR market opening to be I0 million tons of brown rice 
(which can be converted to milled rice by applying a factor of 0.9). The base- 
line price of domestic rice at the wholesale level is assumed to be 329 yenkg 
of brown rice, which is the  1992 average of  free market (black market) rice 
prices based on the survey by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisher- 
ies (1994). The baseline ratio between domestic and import c.i.f. prices is as- 
sumed to be 4 to 1, for the reasons discussed in appendix A. 
13.5.3  Findings 
Results of the simulation analysis are summarized in table  13.4 and figure 
13.4. It must be remembered that the three alternative scenarios for which the 
simulation analysis is carried out are equivalent in terms of producer welfare 
because any welfare loss is supposed to be compensated for by  government 
payment in a decoupled manner. 
Scenario A: No Tarification + Increased Minimum Access + Increased 
Acreage Control 
Scenario A is the current situation, and it is likely to continue in the future. 
According to this scenario, although the domestic price can be maintained at 
the baseline level, domestic output will continue to shrink. Under high price 
support and strengthened acreage control, no momentum can possibly arise for 
structural adjustment geared toward improving farm efficiency. Possible gains 
in social welfare from this market-opening  scheme will be negligible unless 
tariffication is accepted after 2000, since consumers receive no benefit because 
of the maintenance of high prices. 
Nevertheless, this is an attractive scenario for the government. Food Agency 
revenue from  the mark-up of  minimum access import rice  will  amount to 
nearly 200 billion yen in 2000 and reach as much as 400 billion yen in 2006 if 
tariffication is avoided after 2000. The increased revenue, along with a corre- 
sponding expansion in the organization and power of the Food Agency in the 
area of rice trading, will be a bonanza for bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agri- 
culture, Forestry, and Fisheries. For the Ministry of Finance, which is so con- 
cerned about balancing budgets, this scenario is highly attractive because the 
compensation payment to farmers can be more than fully financed by the mark- 
up revenue with no danger of increasing transfers from the general account to 
the  Food  Control  Special Account  under  the  administration  of  the  Food 
Agency. It is also attractive for politicians because they can easily present the 
maintenance of high prices with the rejection of tariffication as their success 
in working strongly for the protection of farmers. 
Because of the preferences of bureaucrats and politicians, it is highly proba- 
ble that this scenario will continue even after 2000 (scenario A-a) instead of 
shifting to tariffication (scenario A-b or A-c). In short, scenario A implies the Table 13.4  Results of the Simulation  Analysis 
Increase Inc  Imports' 
Over  Additional  Tariff/ 
Domestic  Domestic  Minimum  Secondary  Acreage  Mark-up  Producer  Consumer  Budget  Social 
Priceb  Outputc  Total  Access  Tariff  Reductiond  Revenue  Surplus  Surplus  Cost  Welfare 
Scenario"  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Baseline level  329  (100)  10,000  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
A  1995  329  (100)  9,867  400  400  0  I .33  33  -31  0  -2  2 
2000  329  (100)  9,200  800  800  0  8  197  -  I88  0  -9  9 
A-a  2006  329  (100)  8,800  1,200  1,200  0  12  296  -282  0  -  14  14 
A-b  2006  255  (78)  8,128  2,395  1,000  1,395  10  413  -  869  758  456  302 
A-c  2006  255  (78)  8,850  1,673  1,000  673  2  289  -737  758  449  309 
B  1995  323  (98)  9,842  413  300  113  0.83  47  -  80  62  33  28 
2000  292  (89)  9,057  1,184  500  684  5  248  -461  374  212  162 
2006  255  (78)  8,399  2,124  700  1,424  7  367  -  820  758  45 3  305 
2000  275  (84)  9,866  500  500  0  -6  96  -412  550  316  234 
2006  243  (74)  9,924  700  700  0  -  12  112  -626  883  514  369 
C  1995  319  (97)  9,978  300  300  0  -1  20  -  75  99  56  43 
"A: No tariffication + increased minimum access imports + equivalent increase in acreage reduction. 
A-a: Continue the same policy after 2000. 
A-b: Shift to tariffication after 2000 + increase in acreage reduction. 
A-c: Shift to tariffication after 2000 + decrease in acreage reduction. 
B: Tariffication + increase in acreage reduction equivalent to minimum access imports. 
C: Tariffication + decrease in acreage reduction by  1 percent per year of total paddy field area. 
byen  per kilogram. 
Thousand metric tons. 
dPercentage of total paddy field area. 
?Billion yen i.  Domestic rice price (1) 
340 r 
ii.  Domestic rice output(3) 
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continuation of traditional Japanese agricultural policy geared toward charging 
the cost of agricultural protection to consumers with a minimal burden on the 
treasury. 
Scenario B: Tariftication + Increased Acreage Control 
Scenario B would have been the likely situation had tariffication been ac- 
cepted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. In this scenario, the domestic 
price will decline from the baseline by  a modest  11 percent over the first six 
years, entirely as a result of a reduction in the secondary tariff rate, and by 
another  11 percent over the next six years if the same rate of tariff cut is ap- 
plied.  The corresponding  shrinkage  in  domestic  output will  be the  largest 
among the three alternative  scenarios, by about  10 percent by 2000 and  16 
percent by 2006. 
Loss in producer surplus is expected to be large, but nearly half of  the in- 
come compensation required from the government can be financed by the tar- 
iff/mark-up revenue  from increased imports. Still, the additional budget re- 
quirement will amount to about 200 billion yen in 2000 and 450 billion yen in 
2006. Yet social welfare will increase by about 160 billion yen in 2000 and by 
300 billion in 2006. 
Scenario C: Tariftication + Decreased Acreage Control 
A very different picture will emerge under tariffication if acreage control is 
relaxed instead of strengthened. Scenario C will see the largest decline in do- 
mestic price, but domestic production can be maintained at almost the baseline 
level right through to 2006. This is because the increased supply of domestic 
rice will result in a larger price decline than the decline that results from the 
prescribed tariff cut, and thus the importation of foreign rice will be prevented 
from increasing above the minimum access quota. The decline in prices, to- 
gether with greater freedom in land use, is expected to encourage structural 
adjustment in order to improve farm efficiency. The budget costs of 3 16 billion 
yen in 2000 and 514 billion yen in 2006 may appear to be very large but are 
modest  when compared  with the new  six-year agricultural support program 
recently approved, which includes a budget appropriation of 6 trillion yen as 
compensation to farmers for rice market opening due to the UR agreement. 
Social  welfare gains  from this  market-opening  scheme will  be  the highest 
among the three alternatives because of the large gain in consumer surplus. 
For bureaucrats,  however, Food Agency  revenue  from the  tariff/mark-up 
will be  small and thus will fall far too  short of  compensation  payments to 
farmers. In other words, this scenario reduces the consumer burden of agricul- 
tural protection at the expense of  the treasury. For this reason, despite its large 
contribution to the social welfare of the nation as well as its encouragement of 
domestic rice production, this scenario is unlikely to be adopted. 393  Rice Policy in Japan 
13.6  Conclusion 
In  general,  agriculture  tends  to  be  protected  in  high-income  countries 
largely because consumers in affluent economies tolerate high food prices. Ja- 
pan is no exception to this rule. Furthermore, Japan is no exception to the ten- 
dency that the lower a country’s comparative  advantage in  agriculture,  the 
higher its agricultural protection.  This tendency emerges partly because ag- 
ricultural industries that have declining comparative advantage face more seri- 
ous adjustment problems and, thereby, demand more government assistance. 
But an equally or even more important reason appears to be that it is much 
easier for the importer of agricultural commodities to charge the cost of ag- 
ricultural protection to consumers by means of border protection, resulting in 
less pressure on the treasury. However, agricultural protection by the exporter 
tends to be more constrained because it relies heavily on government expendi- 
ture, which can be politically costly. 
From this perspective, the UR agricultural negotiations geared toward cur- 
tailing  agricultural  protection  are considered to have been  undertaken  and 
somehow successfully concluded because the European Union began to share 
an interest with the United States in the fact that it has become a major exporter 
of agricultural commodities since the early 1980s. In contrast, Japan has con- 
tinued to be a major importer and, hence, has not been subject to such severe 
pressure from the treasury to reduce agricultural protection. In the absence of 
domestic support arising from the point of view of budget savings, Japanese 
negotiators chose the option of waiting for the other two major players to work 
out a solution and then accepted the agreement to a minimal extent; this was 
achieved with the exemption of rice from tariffication. 
One could guess that the reason this formula is acceptable at home is not 
because it protects the interests of  farmers. Possible negative effects of  rice 
tariffication on domestic agriculture are expected to be very modest by all cal- 
culations and can be eliminated altogether if countered by appropriate domes- 
tic policies. As suggested by the results in this paper, the increased minimum 
access import quotas to which Japan committed itself for the purpose of com- 
pensation could have more adverse effects than tariffication. The decision to 
avoid rice tariffication could be interpreted  as a move to protect the vested 
interests of  the Food Agency and agricultural cooperatives, who have strong 
control over rice marketing. 
Avoiding tariffication,  when  coupled  with  increased  acreage  reductions 
equivalent to minimum access imports, will make it difficult for consumers to 
enjoy any benefits from the opening of the rice market. But because it does not 
require additional budget expenditure, this scheme is likely to meet with the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance and related political circles. This would 
suggest that the traditional policy mix of supporting producer prices while cur- 
tailing domestic production via acreage control will continue in the future that 394  Yujiro Hayami and Yoshihisa Godo 
is, scenario A in our simulation. Under such a policy, little momentum will 
emerge for inducing structural adjustments in agriculture in order to close the 
productivity gap with overseas producers. In  contrast, options like scenario 
C in the simulation analysis (i.e., accepting tariffication and relaxing acreage 
control) are less likely to be adopted because of opposition from the aforemen- 
tioned political groups and the treasury. 
Within certain groups it is often said that the international competitive power 
of Japan's agricultural industry will weaken without certain changes in govern- 
ment agricultural p01icy.'~  However, the evasion of  tariffication could mean 
that the present course will continue at least for the time being. 
Appendix A 
On the DifSerence between Domestic and Border Prices 
in Japan 
During the autarky with respect to rice ending in 1993, it was difficult to esti- 
mate the tariff equivalent for rice because of a sheer absence of border prices. 
An  early attempt to estimate the border price was made in the report by  the 
USITC  (1990). Based  a comparison between  the average government sale 
price in Japan and the ex mill price of medium-grain rice in California plus the 
cost of  shipment to Japan, the USITC concluded that the tariff equivalent for 
rice would amount to as much as 600-700  percent. 
However this USITC calculation is considered to be a gross overestimation, 
partly because quality differences were not considered, but more critically be- 
cause  several  important  cost  components  such  as  interest  and  insurance 
charges were not counted (Godo and Owens 1995). Estimates by  Y.  Hayami 
that incorporate all possible marketing costs turned out to range from 200 to 
300 percent depending on assumptions about quality differences (see Forum 
for Policy Innovation 1990). 
The emergency imports that occurred in the 1993 rice year as a result of 
domestic crop failures produced an opportunity for the evaluation of foreign 
rice in the Japanese market. Even though this market test could not be espe- 
cially accurate under such conditions, it is still useful information for a broad 
estimation of the tariff equivalent. 
Column (1) in table 13A.1 reports government sale prices to wholesalers of 
imported rice from various countries. These prices were determined by  the 
Food Agency when it began to sell imported rice in November 1993. Relative 
to  the price  of  Japanese rice,  imported rice  of  Japonica type  from  U.S.- 
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Table 13A.1  Comparison between Government Sale Prices and Import c.i.f. Price of 
Foreign Rice, 1993 Rice Year (November 1993-October  1994) 
Government Sale Price 
Import 
Initial"  Revisedb  c.i.f. Price'  (1~3)  (2~3) 












236.5  (78) 
208.9  (69) 
223.1  (74) 
205.6  (68) 
218.6  (72) 
213.6  (71) 
199.98  (66) 
302.  Id (100) 
240.7  (80) 
137.9  (46) 
242.6  (80) 
128.1  (42) 
144.3  (48) 
128.1  (42) 




71.3  3.1 
52.8  3.9f 
4.1' 
4.0' 








Sources: Government sale price, announced by  the Food Agency; import c.i.f. price, Japan Ministry of 
Finance, Customs Bureau, Nihon Boeki Geppyou (Japan exports and imports) (Tokyo, various issues). 
Nofee.  Prices are brown rice prices in yen per kilogram. 
"Effective before 26 August 1994. 
hEffective  after 26 August 1994. 
'Average for November 1993-October  1994. 
dAverage  for government rice, grades 1-5. 
'Divided by the average c.i.f. price for the United States. 
'Divided by the average c.i.f. price for China. 
XPrice  in milled rice. 
California, Australia, and China had prices that were about 20 percent lower, 
while the prices of Indica rice from U.S.-South and Thailand were more than 
30 percent lower. 
These prices are considered the Food Agency's expectations of the market 
value of  imported rice. Yet  the sale of  foreign rice, especially of  the Indica 
type, proved to be slow at these prices despite sharp rises in the price of domes- 
tic rice in the free (black) market in the first half of  1994. With the growing 
expectation that a large stock of foreign rice would be left unsold by the end 
of the 1993 rice year (actually the stock in October 1994 turned out to be 980 
thousand tons, about one-third of total imports), the Food Agency decided in 
August  1994 to lower the sale prices of Indica rice and low-quality Japonica 
rice from China, as indicated in column (2). 
It is obvious that the initial government sale prices in column (1) represented 
overestimates of market-clearing prices of  foreign rice in Japan. It is not so 
obvious whether the revised prices in column (2)  were also overestimates un- 
der normal market conditions, even though the stock of  foreign rice has re- 
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of the Indica type from Thailand, has been created by the Food Agency's scare 
purchase of an amount far exceeding the absorptive capacity of the Japanese 
market. If Thai rice had been imported commercially in an appropriate quan- 
tity under normal market conditions, its price could have been higher than that 
shown in column (2).  It may not be unreasonable to expect that market prices 
of foreign rice at the wholesale level in a normal situation would be somewhere 
between the initial and the revised prices. 
Columns (4) and (5) are obtained by dividing the initial and the revised 
government sale prices by  the import c.i.f. prices in order to develop a range 
of estimates of the domestic-border price ratio for rice. The domestic-border 
price ratios thus calculated were lower than 4 (except that for Chinese rice) 
before the revision in August 1994. 
The c.i.f. prices of  1993-94  in column (3) could have been much higher 
than normal because of the effect of sudden large-scale purchases by Japan on 
the volatile world rice market. On the other hand, in a normal year, when the 
supply of domestic rice is abundant, foreign rice could only have been sold at 
much lower prices than the government set in this situation. Moreover, to be 
exactly comparable with the government sale price  of  domestic rice  at the 
wholesale level, border prices must include various marketing costs of moving 
rice from the port to the government warehouse in addition to the c.i.f. price. 
According to our rough calculation, this additional cost would amount to about 
25 yen/kg. To that extent, the domestic-border price ratios in columns (4) and 
(5) may involve a 30-50  percent overestimation. 
Considering all such possibilities,  it is highly unlikely that the domestic- 
border price ratio of rice in Japan today (the first half of  1995) would exceed 4 
with a tariff equivalent of  300 percent. In our simulation analysis this upper- 
end estimate is used so as not to underestimate the impact of tariffication on 
the domestic rice market. 
Appendix B 
Formulas for the Simulation Analysis 
This appendix specifies formulas used for the simulation analysis whose re- 
sults are shown in table 13.4 and figure 13.4. The demand and supply functions 
are specified as 
Demand:  qd = yp-", 
Supply:  q, = 6ApP, 
where qd and q, are quantities of demand and supply, respectively; p is price; 
A is area planted in rice; -a  and p are price elasticities of demand and supply, 
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determined at the market equilibrium,  A is considered to be exogenously deter- 
mined by the government acreage control program. 
The elasticities (Y  and p are assumed to be 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. We 
measure price and quantity in units of yen per kilogram and thousand metric 
tons, both in brown rice terms. Then the baseline (pre-market-opening) price 
and quantity for the Japanese rice market are p  = 329 yenkg and q = 10,000 
metric tons. Normalizing  A in the baseline year as 1, y = 3 1,868 and 6 = 985. 
If  all minimum access import rice is supplied to the domestic rice market, 
its price falls drastically. Thus the Japanese government will likely keep some 
minimum access import rice for several years after the begining of minimum 
access import activities, as stock or for foreign aid. We  assume that only after 
1999 will all of the minimum access imports be supplied to the domestic rice 
market. Until  1999 the volume of minimum access imported rice sold in the 
domestic rice market in year t measured in thousand metric tons (m)  is calcu- 
lated as follows: 
t - 1994 
6 
m= -~  X 800  for scenario A, 
t -  1994  m = --- X 500  for scenarios B and C. 
6 
In our simulation the cost of accumulation of rice stock or foreign aid is ab- 
stracted out. 
The import price of foreign rice of the same quality as Japanese rice is as- 
sumed to be one-quarter of the baseline domestic price. 
The equation numbers for the different scenarios indicated below corre- 
spond to column numbers in table 13.4: 
(1) is the solution forp in the equation 
6 (1 -  0.01 X (7))Ap  + (6) + m = yp-"  for all scenarios. 
(2) = 100 X (1)/329  for all scenarios. 
(3) = 6 (1 -  0.01 X (7))App  for all scenarios. 
(4) = (5) + (6)  for all scenarios. 
(5) = 400 + (800 -  400) X (t -  1995)/5  fort = 1995-2000forscenarioA. 
= 800 + (1,200 -  800) X (t -  2006)/6  fort = 2000-2006 for scenario 
= 800 + (1,000 -  800) X (t -  2006)/6  for t = 2000-2006 for scenarios 
= 300 + (500 -  300) X (t -  1995)/5  fort = 1995-2000 for scenarios 
A-a. 
A-b mdA-c. 
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= 500 + (700 -  500) X (t -  2006)/6  fort = 2000-2006 for scenarios 
B and C. 
(6) = 0  for t = 1995-2000 for scenario A. 
= 0  for t = 2000-2006  for scenario A-a. 
= max [O, y q  -LI -  6 (1 -  0.01 X (7))A  qP -  (5)] 
= max (0, y q-"  -  6 (1 -0.01  X (7))A  qP  -  (5))  for scenarios B and C, 
fort = 2000-2006 for 
scenarios A-b and A-c. 
where 
q=329X  1+3 I---------  x o.i5)],  [  (  -i994 
which is the import price of rice including tariff. 
(7) = m/lO,OOO  for t = 1995-2000 for scenariosA and B. 
= (5)/10,000 
= 800/10,000 -  (t -  2000) 
= -  (t -  1994) 
fort =  2000-2006  for scenarios A-a, A-b, and B. 
fort = 2000-2006  for scenario A-c. 
fort = 1995-2006 for scenario C. 
(8) = 0.001 X ((6) + m)  X ((1) -  329/4)  for scenarios B and C. 
(9) =  0.001 X ((1) X (3) -  329 X  10,000)/(1 + p)  forall scenarios. 
yp-" dp  for all scenarios. 
The reason for multiplying by 0.001 in equations (8), (9), and (10) is to express 
the answer in units of billion yen. 
(1 1) = (8) + (9)  for all scenarios. 
(12) = (8) + (9) + (10)  for all scenarios. 
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COlllIIlent  Ammar Siamwalla 
The paper by Hayami and Godo asks why the Japanese government was willing 
to trade an extra minimum access quota for the right not to tariff. It has ac- 
cepted a minimum access amount of imports that starts at 4 percent, rising to 
8 percent, compared to other advanced countries, which are allowed to set their 
minimum access level at 3 percent, rising to 5 percent. In exchange, Japan (and 
Korea), unlike other signatories to the World Trade Organization, does not have 
to bind tariffs for the amount in excess of the minimum access amount. 
The answer the authors give to this question  lies in the special objective 
function of the government. The government is asserted to have to trade off 
between  the budget cost (and revenues) from different policy measures and 
the benefits to producers, with consumers having negligible weight within that 
objective function. Since the domestic support is to be manipulated  so as to 
maintain farmers’ welfare intact, the main criterion left is the minimization of 
the budget cost of the new arrangement. 
With these assumptions,  the authors show that the main benefit  from the 
point of view of the government is that the minimum access route lowered the 
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budget cost relative to the tariffication route. The main benefit does not come 
from revenue from the quota rent because, by  the authors’ calculations, the 
minimum access route actually reduces that. Rather the main benefit is from 
saving on domestic supports, as farmers do not suffer as severe a price cut or 
output fall with the minimum access route. 
My problem with the authors’ exercises is with the particular model used. 
First of all, it is not clear whether the conventional supply model is quite rele- 
vant to the task at hand. The presence of  set-asides would imply that farm 
output is not on the supply curve. The use of the supply elasticity in this context 
is therefore highly questionable, even if the estimate were obtained correctly. 
The second problem is that the authors make no explicit assumption as to 
the future course of world prices and the yen-dollar exchange rate. Demand 
and supply conditions in Japan may be such that the stationary characterization 
that the authors have chosen is appropriate. This lack of consideration of long- 
term changes carries a message to which I shall return. 
My next problem is the omission of  the kind of  considerations that moti- 
vated Weitzman in his classic piece on “Prices vs. Quantities” (1974). The 
choice of the minimum access instrument is basically a choice of the quantity 
instrument (as is, of course, the set-aside instrument), whereas tariffication is 
a choice of  the price instrument. There are uncertainties in the government’s 
perception  of  the future course of  demand and supply and above all of the 
future course of world prices. Of course, the Weitzman analysis is relevant for 
a government that is intent on maximizing efficiency, which is not the case 
with the Japanese government. But the central point made in that paper, that it 
is uncertainty that makes for a substantive difference in the two modes of pol- 
icy is, I think, quite robust. 
Let me play devil’s advocate and argue the case from the Japanese govern- 
ment’s point of view.  I would then maintain that we all, including Japanese 
bureaucrats, are quite uncertain about the future course of world dollar prices 
and of the yen-dollar exchange rate. By this I do not mean the uncertainty that 
arises from yearly fluctuations that would necessitate fine-tuning and invoca- 
tion of the safeguard measures allowed for in the Uruguay Round outcome. 
Rather, I mean the mistakes that the government could make about the secular 
trends of these variables. After all, one of the main reasons why Japanese rice 
prices are now stuck at such a high level relative to the world price is that the 
real exchange rate of the Japanese yen has gone up by so much. 
There is no permanent safeguard to counter such a miscalculation of trends. 
Now if  domestic supply and demand curves do not shift much, the manage- 
ment of the domestic price support program would produce fewer surprises in 
the domestic price level, and therefore in the budget, with a known amount of 
minimum access than with tariffication. 
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Comment  Kym Anderson 
This is a wonderful case study on a very important aspect of  the Uruguay 
Round. It has direct relevance for the political economy of other rice markets 
(most notably Korea’s) and for other state-trading situations (e.g., BULOG in 
Indonesia). The economic consequences of the policy outcome it focuses on 
are important not only for Japan but also for other rice-trading nations, both 
exporters and importers. And since this perennial issue of agricultural protec- 
tionism is bound to continue to be thorny in subsequent multilateral, regional, 
and bilateral trade negotiations, getting a better understanding of why govern- 
ments intervene in the ways they do remains an important research topic. 
The paper is in the spirit of the neoclassical theories of politics, of bureau- 
cracy, and of  regulation generally. It provides yet  another illustration of  the 
difficulty of reversing ever rising complexity in regulatory control, as analyzed 
recently by Krueger and Duncan (1994): when policies are not working well, 
the tendency of governments is to add another layer of intervention rather than 
dismantle the existing problematic regulations. It was a phenomenon that led 
Harry Johnson to say to policymakers in such situations, “Don’t just do some- 
thing; stand there!” But the frequency with which such pleas are ignored re- 
minds us of Stigler’s view that “a policy adopted and followed for a long time, 
or followed by  many states, could not usefully be described as a mistake. . . . 
To  say that such policies are mistaken is to say that one cannot explain them” 
(Stigler 1975, x). 
Clearly, Hayami and Godo, following Stigler, have begun with the assump- 
tion that the Japanese government opted not to tariffy its rice policy because 
this choice was in some domestic constituency’s vested interest. They argue 
that it is the Food Agency that stands to gain from the slight opening-up of the 
Japanese rice market with imports controlled administratively rather than by 
tariffs. The authors mention that the benefits to that group come in two forms: 
one of continuing to be the monopoly distributor of what will be an expanded 
volume of rice in the country and the other of being able to retain the large 
difference between  domestic and import prices. That revenue can then be 
shared with farmers via payments to the agricultural cooperatives. The authors 
might also have mentioned that by controlling rice imports the Food Agency 
can manipulate the quality of imported rice available for sale (e.g., placing 
only inferior imported rice on the domestic market so as to give the [incorrect] 
impression that only Japanese farmers know how to produce rice for Japanese 
palates). Tariffication, on the other hand, would mean that the revenue from 
that price difference would go to the Finance Ministry instead of  the Food 
Agency. That would more obviously expose for debate the questions of why 
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the tariff and hence consumer prices of rice should be so high, why so much 
money should be transferred from the budget to farmers, and why the Food 
Agency’s monopoly on rice distribution should continue. Tariffication would 
also make it less easy for the government to manipulate the source of imports 
(e.g., so as to placate aggressive unilateral pressure from the United States). 
The authors use the simplest possible model of the market for rice to make 
their key economic points. That seems perfectly appropriate. Obviously, if one 
wanted more precise estimates of the magnitude of those effects, one would 
distinguish Indica from Japonica varieties and take into account the impact 
Japan’s purchase of  Japonica rice from California or Australia might have on 
the international price of that type of rice. But for present purposes their simple 
model is quite adequate. 
Less adequate, however, is their implicit model of the political market. It 
involves just rice producers and consumers, plus the Food Agency, coopera- 
tives, and the treasury. The authors point out that the importance of  rice in 
household consumption (and of  farmers in total employment) has fallen to 
such low levels in Japan that the impact of holding up the consumer price of 
rice on real wages is very slight. Hence, they claim, there is no effective oppo- 
sition to rice protectionism from nonagricultural employers (unlike early in 
this century-see  Hayami 1975). 
Perhaps the authors are right to ignore the impact of rice policy and associ- 
ated zoning of land use on the price of land in Japan. Large though it is, it may 
nonetheless create little effective opposition to farm policy because the losers 
are so dispersed. Likewise, the widespread negative effect of farm protection 
on producers of nonfarm tradables, via its strengthening of the yen, may have 
become too small per industry group to make it worth their while to try to 
overcome the free-rider problem of getting together with other industry groups 
to oppose farm protection. Those are standard general equilibrium effects of 
sectoral assistance to declining industries in the course of economic develop- 
ment (Anderson 1995). 
However, this is a closed model of  the political market. It ignores the in- 
creasing reality of international pressures on domestic politics as international- 
ization proceeds. The Uruguay Round offered a major new opportunity for 
commercial diplomatic pressures to be used to upset domestic political market 
equilibria around the world (Anderson 1992). Evidently it was not enough to 
bring about rice tariffication in Japan. Why not? And at what price? 
One of  the additional, external reasons as to “why not” may  be that the 
United States perceived its interests to be better served with greater market 
opening (8 rather than 5 percent of domestic sales to be imported by 2000) and 
a chance to pressure Japan to buy a disproportionately large share of  those 
imports from the United States if quantitative import restrictions remained. 
Moreover, the price Japan is to pay for being allowed not to tariffy may be 
far from trivial. Indeed, Japan has already paid a high price in the form of 
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by  being seen to be unwilling to compromise on its agricultural policy, Japan’s 
capacity to obtain greater market access abroad for Japanese exporters was 
severely curtailed. To see this, consider the insights from the political economy 
models developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Hillman and Moser 
(1995). Those models suggest that trade negotiations can be perceived as an 
exchange of market access. Assume each country has a closed polity and its 
political market for protection is in equilibrium (with import-competing sec- 
tors enjoying more political power than exporter interests, for the reasons can- 
vassed in Krueger 1989). Then assume the opportunity to enter into trade nego- 
tiations arises. It may  then pay  each country’s government to reduce import 
protection somewhat in exchange for market access abroad for the country’s 
exporters. That is, the new  opportunity offered by  the Uruguay  Round in- 
creases the incentive for exporters to lobby against import protection at home 
if that can lead, as a quid pro quo, to less protection abroad against their ex- 
port products. 
The irony is that Japan is committed to providing considerably more rice 
import access than it would have had to under tariffication, and yet it has left 
the impression that it is unprepared to play by the same rules as other Uruguay 
Round signatories. Had it not left that impression, it is unlikely that its confron- 
tation with the United States over trade in autos and parts would have pro- 
gressed to the extent that it had by June 1995. 
The authors are fairly pessimistic about further rice policy reform after the 
turn of the century. To the extent that the above point has validity, perhaps their 
pessimism is excessive. As well, the APEC forum will add to unilateral pres- 
sures from the United States and others for “fairer” trade practice by Japan. 
A further reason for the authors’ pessimism-based  on the experience to 
date with beef tariffication-also  is questionable. From inspection of their ta- 
ble 13.2, the authors conclude that had beef tariffication followed the Uruguay 
Round rules, it would not have been followed by increased beef imports. They 
base this on the absence of an  increase in beef import growth after tariffication. 
That prompts three points. First, the volume of  imports was growing at 20 
percent per year from 1986 because of  pressure from the United States and 
others to expand import quotas and in the expectation that liberalization was 
inevitably to be required as part of the Uruguay Round accord. Second, when 
tariffication looked likely to be part of the Uruguay Round agreement, Japan 
may have chosen to tariffy beef early so it could be at a higher rate than after 
further import quota expansion. In addition, it might have hoped that early beef 
tariffication would make a postponement of  rice tariffication less objection- 
able. And third, apart from  1991, import growth after tariffication has been 
almost as rapid as in the previous six years-and  it is expected by those in the 
trade to continue at that high rate for the remainder of  the decade as the tariff 
continues to drop from 50 to 30 percent. In short, the beef case is one of phe- 
nomenal import liberalization, and one that cannot be reversed because the 
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should not be underestimated, even if the initial tariff levels have a lot of “wa- 
ter” in them. And  because tariff revenue goes to the Finance Ministry, any 
attempt to use it to subsidize farm incomes requires that it go through the 
annual budget process, making the assistance more transparent and open to 
budget scrutiny every year-unlike  the case for rice at present in Japan. 
One final point: Is there anything else about beef that facilitated the substan- 
tial liberalization of  that market? In fact there is. During recent years there 
have been substantial investments by  Japanese firms in beef feedlots abroad. 
Over time that has given birth to a domestic constituency with a direct interest 
in beef import liberalization. It seems unlikely that such a development will 
have a rice parallel to the same extent, in which case it is all the more necessary 
for Japan’s exporters of manufactures to mobilize more lobbying against rice 
protectionism if  they are to avoid the trade skirmishes of the sort we saw in 
mid-1995 between the United States and Japan over auto trade. 
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